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ABSTRACT 
The proponents of globalization contend that European countries are now converging on an 
Anglo-American model of capitalism. Contrary to this prediction, this paper will show that in 
Spain globalization and EMU have promoted rather than undermined coordination among eco-
nomic actors. Unable to escape from economic interdependence the Spanish economic actors 
have developed coordinating capacities at the macro and micro levels to address and resolve ten-
sions between economic interdependence and political sovereignty. In this paper I show that there 
is at least one more variety than the two–LME and CME–that Hall and Soskice cite and also that it 
is possible to develop coordination capacities in countries that lack a strong tradition of such 
capacities. In particular, this paper analyzes the resurgence of national-level social bargaining in 
Spain in the 1990s. This development was the result of the reorientation of the strategies of the 
social actors. In a new economic and political context, marked by a process of institutional learn-
ing, trade unions have supported social bargaining as a defensive strategy to retake the initiative 
and influence policy outcomes.  
 
Introduction 
Is globalization forcing non-“Coordinated Market Economies” (CMEs) such as 
Spain to converge on an Anglo-American model? In the opinion of some scholars, the 
combined impetuses of globalization and the process of European monetary unification   2 
have imposed exigencies of increasing competitiveness on national economies, which 
have compelled countries to deregulate their labor markets, welfare systems, and in-
dustrial relations (Crouch and Streeck 1997). According to this view, these pressures for 
change have undermined coordinating capacity. This paper describes a research project1 
that challenges the interpretation according to which the responses of European coun-
tries to these pressures are uniform, and the argument that increasing exposure to trade, 
foreign direct investment, and liquid capital mobility have prompted a pervasive race to 
the neoliberal bottom among countries. Contrary to those predictions, it shows that in 
Spain globalization and economic integration have promoted rather than undermined 
the development of cooperative institutional settings and “institutional complementari-
ties.” Unable to escape from economic interdependence, Spain has experimented with 
social concertation⎯that is, centralized agreements between business and labor organiza-
tions, often with the participation of the state, on wages and other social goals⎯as a 
means to address and resolve tensions between economic interdependence and political 
sovereignty, and between monetary and exchange rate policies (see Cameron 1998).  
In addition, this article seeks to address the impact of globalization and Euro-
pean economic integration on the literature of neocorporatism. The neocorporatist lit-
erature seemed to show in the 1970s that centralized social bargaining (or concertation) 
could mitigate the tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment by allowing economic 
actors and governments to coordinate their actions and resolve certain collective action 
problems (Schmitter 1981; Cameron 1984; Bruno and Sachs 1985). This early optimism 
was subsequently dispelled. Much of the literature of the 1980s argued that centralized 
bargaining could succeed only in countries that met certain institutional criteria: highly 
encompassing and cohesive business and labor organizations, coordinated collective 
bargaining, and Social Democratic parties in government. Changes in the world econ-
omy, however, led other scholars (Scharpf 1987; Iversen 1999) to argue that the decline 
of Fordism, the liberalization and integration of financial markets, and changes in sec-
toral and occupational structures had undermined the bases for centralized bargaining. 
This tendency, according to these authors, would be reinforced by events such as Euro-
pean Monetary Union that would further decouple the level at which macroeconomic 
policy was set (Iversen 1999). In other words, these developments would confirm the 
undoing of Schmitter’s “Century of Corporatism” (1974) (Pérez 1998; Royo 2000).  
                                                           
1This paper is part of a larger research project that analyzes instances of coordination in non-CMEs. It 
focuses on two European countries (Spain and Portugal) and a Latin American one (Argentina). This re-
search project pursues two main objectives. First, to review the political economy literature on institutions 
and to explain the ways in which they affect the behavior of economic agents. Moreover, since companies 
are the locus for wealth creation, it becomes crucial to understand how government actions, local contexts, 
and institutional settings could enhance their competitiveness and foster markets for ideas, capital, and peo-
ple (Hamel 2000). In addition, at a time in which there are significant competitive pressures across countries 
to deregulate and increase competitiveness, it is important to analyze the impact that different institutional 
settings have on business activities. It is also necessary to explore the prospects of building coordination ca-
pacity in countries that lack a propitious institutional framework. Thus, this project (which will include the 
analysis of other instances of cooperation at the micro level in later stages) will help to answer key questions 
such as: what kind of institutions favor enhanced competitiveness and promote entrepreneurship and inno-
vation? how can firms exploit to their advantage the institutional setting in which they are operating? how 
much institutional change is possible? and, can the knowledge and experience accumulated during institu-
tional reforms in industrialized countries be used in other countries?   3 
This conclusion, however, is challenged by the resurgence of national-level bar-
gaining on income policy and other economic issues in a number of European states 
such as Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, or Ireland during the 1980s and 1990s. 
This article analyses the resurgence of national-level social bargaining in Spain. In this 
country social bargaining emerged in the 1970s and, after a breakdown in the second 
half of the 1980s, it resurfaced in the mid-1990s. It will question how national-level social 
bargaining reemerged in Spain during the last decade, despite unpropitious institutional 
and structural conditions. 
The resurgence of social concertation in Spain has been the result of the reorien-
tation of the strategies of the social actors. In the new context of the 1980s and 1990s, 
trade union organizations have supported tripartite bargaining as a defensive strategy to 
retake the initiative and influence policy outcomes. In addition, the resurgence of social 
bargaining has been fostered by a process of institutional learning, which led union 
leaders to conclude that previous confrontational strategies were detrimental to the in-
terest of their constituencies, and threatened their own survival.  
Spain offers an ideal venue for examining the relationship between corporatist 
arrangements and globalization because it is one of the few instances in which social 
bargaining emerged in an institutional and structural context markedly different from 
that of the small European states of Northern and Central Europe. Spain cannot be clas-
sified as a Liberal Market Economy (LMEs) (i.e., like Britain, Australia, or the United 
States), or as a Coordinated Market Economy (CMEs) (i.e., like Germany, Japan, Sweden, 
Austria, or the Netherlands). On the contrary, Spain displays what some authors have 
referred to as a distinctive “Mediterranean” style of capitalism (Rhodes 1998). Hence, 
Spain offers an opportunity to research the impact of a different institutional setting on 
social democratic corporatist policies. 
In addition, analysis of the Spanish experiences with social bargaining will show 
that arguments about the demise of national autonomy in the global economy are over-
drawn. Increasing foreign direct investment, exposure to trade, and liquid capital mo-
bility did not prevent the emergence and consolidation of social bargaining in Spain. The 
Spanish government and the social actors faced strong political incentives to cushion, 
through social bargaining, the dislocations generated by the integration of the Spanish 
economy in the European Community (1986) and European Monetary Union (1998). The 
combined impetuses of globalization and monetary integration promoted, rather than 
hindered, social bargaining. 
The study of the Spanish case will confirm that the link between changes in the 
international economic environment and the process of domestic policy making also de-
pends on domestic political and economic factors. They provide their own set of incen-
tives for domestic actors to entertain certain political strategies. 
The paper is divided into four main sections. First I discuss the methodology and 
the theoretical framework. In the second section, I outline the process of social concerta-
tion in Spain from a comparative perspective. In the third section, I look at the empirical 
puzzle and explain the return of social bargaining in Spain. I conclude the paper by 
looking at future prospects. 
   4 
Methodology 
In order to account for the resurgence of social bargaining in Spain, this article 
has chosen a historical and institutional approach that considers the objectives of policy-
makers and social actors, as well as the way that they interpret existing economic and 
political conditions. This approach allows the researcher to examine the ways institu-
tions structure the relations among actors and shape their interests and goals, thus con-
straining political struggles and influencing outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 
1992: 2). 
Most of the research material for this project has been gathered in Spain. In order 
to pursue this analysis, the author conducted an extensive review of the secondary lit-
erature and has interviewed scholars, social actors, and policymakers. He has met with 
employers and representatives from the main business confederations in Spain, and has 
conducted interviews with the leaders of the major trade unions, as well as leaders and 
representatives of the main political parties. In addition, he has interviewed former and 
current high-ranking officials from state agencies: ministries of labor, economics, the 
central bank, and the institutions in charge of fostering social bargaining (the Consejo 
Económico y Social, or CES). Finally, he has conferred with leading scholars and special-
ists in politics, industrial relations, and economics in Spain and the United States. Over-
all, he has interviewed over twenty-five people.2 In addition, secondary sources of data 
come from the libraries and records of selected government departments and the social 
actors. These records provided data on the organization, structure, and strength of the 
social partners and their strategies. 
 
The Theoretical Context 
Basic factor endowments such as labor, land or capital, influence economic and 
business strategies and condition managerial decisions. The role of these factors has 
been extensively analyzed by the literature (Porter 1990; Kotler et al. 1997; Fairbanks, 
Lindsay and Porter 1997). Institutional factors also hinder or facilitate the strategies of 
governments and companies. Nevertheless, more recently the political economy litera-
ture has attempted to explain cross-national patterns of economic policy and perform-
ance (Hall 1999; Iversen 1999), and institutional theories have focused mainly on the 
analysis of organizational change (Powell and Dimaggio 1991). In this manner, institu-
tional economists have attempted to explain the ways in which institutions and institu-
tional change affect the performance of national economies (North 1990; Alston, Eggerts-
son and North 1996). 
Building on the new economics of organization, a group of scholars has devel-
oped a new theory of “comparative institutional advantage” that offers new explanations 
for the response of firms and nations to the challenges of globalization and economic in-
tegration (Hall and Soskice 2001). They argue that the institutional frameworks within 
which firms operate may condition what they can do. The key conclusion of these au-
thors is that that there is more than one path to economic success and that nations do not 
have to converge to a single Anglo-American model. The focus of this literature, how-
                                                           
2Interviews took place in Spain in 1996-97, 2000-01, and 2003-04. For an extensive comparative study of 
social concertation in Spain and Portugal, from which this article draws, see Royo 2002.   5 
ever, has been on the so-called “liberal” and “coordinated” industrialized economies of 
Western Europe, North America, and Asia. This research project builds on these find-
ings and tests these hypotheses on Spain, a country that cannot be easily classified as ei-
ther a “liberal” or “coordinated” economy. The institutional frameworks that exist in Spain 
defy easy classifications. Contrary to predictions, however, Spanish economic institu-
tions are not converging toward an Anglo-American model. 
This paper illustrates that outcome differences at the macro level reflect diver-
gences at the micro level, as the social actors pursue new strategies to respond to com-
petitive pressures (Thelen 2001: 72). In Spain the decision by economic actors to develop 
coordination capacities has been influenced by the position of the country in the inter-
national division of labor. The predominance of labor-intensive low-value-added firms 
over high-skilled-based ones has influenced the choices of governments, unions and 
firms, and it has determined their policy preferences. This is so because in Spain, with a 
predominance of low-value-added firms, firms base their competitiveness mainly on 
low costs, high versatility, and the ability to adjust rapidly to changing market condi-
tions. Hence, there is a greater need for generalized labor market flexibility, and a lesser 
one for the development of a highly educated and cooperative labor force. Spanish firms 
derive their institutional competitive advantage from the capacity of their institutional 
context efficiently to provide firms with weak collective goods, high versatility and 
rapid adjustment to changing markets (Regini 2000).  
Furthermore, it shows that coordination is a political process. In a context of 
structural changes we have to examine the political settlements that motivate the social 
actors. It agrees with Thelen (2001: 73) that the focus on the “political dynamics” helps to 
underline that coordination is not just a “thing that some countries have and others 
lack.” Indeed, the Spanish experience shows that coordination is possible in countries 
that “lack” the appropriate institutional setting, and that it can be sustained over a pe-
riod of time. In Spain the social actors have rejected the lower-cost alternative of pure 
deregulation and decentralization and, instead, lacking the strong non-market coordi-
nation mechanisms that characterize CMEs, have developed innovative strategies to se-
cure cooperation. This decision underlines a shift in power relations caused by structural 
changes that has resulted in a new dynamic equilibrium between union and employers. 
 
Social Pacts in Spain 
Social pacts emerged in Spain in a context marked by the democratic transition 
and the economic crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s. The intensity of the crisis convinced 
the Spanish social actors of the need to implement an incomes policy based on top-level 
agreements among the major labor confederations, the employers associations, and at 
times the government. This process was known as “social concertation.” Originally, the 
purpose of these agreements was to restrain wage demands to control inflation and fos-
ter the recovery of business profits, as well as to contain labor militancy, which might 
pose a threat to the stability of the new regime by provoking the army and the extreme 
right (Royo 2000: 5). In Spain, the social actors signed six major agreements in the late 
1970s and mid-1980s (see Miguélez and Prieto 1999, Roca 1993, Solé 1985, Giner and 
Sevilla 1984). The government only signed two of them. Concertation collapsed after 
1986 and re-emerged in the mid-1990s (see Table 1).    6 
 
The Empirical Puzzle 
What is remarkable about the emergence of social concertation was that Spain 
lacked a tradition of social bargaining among democratic actors. In fact, it had no experi-
ence with the neocorporatist agreements that had been an integral part of the industrial 
relations setting in many other European nations. In Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Finland, and Belgium, among other countries, social bargaining had been the preferred 
mechanism to regulate relations among social actors after World War II. In these coun-
tries social democratic parties remained in power for an extensive period of time, and 
they sought to implement traditional social democratic policies to achieve full employ-
ment. At the core of such policies lies a compromise among business, the state, and the 
organized working class in which all partners cooperate to promote what might be de-
scribed as a virtuous circle of full employment, economic growth, and welfare state 
redistributive measures. Social concertation plays a critical role in such social democratic 
experiments because it is the institutional instrument that “delivers” incomes policy, or 
the wage restraint that results from top-level negotiations between business organiza-
tions and trade unions. Under these agreements unions agree to wage moderation in ex-
change for material and political compensation from business and the state. (Royo 2000: 
9-11). The success of this strategy, however, depends on unions’ cooperation in imple-
menting incomes policy and controlling inflation. According to the corporatist literature, 
the organizational prerequisites for concertation include the presence of highly central-
ized and encompassing unions and employer associations, and a peak-level system of 
wage bargaining (Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982; Goldthorpe 1984). 
A comparison of these institutional factors across European countries suggests 
that Spain does not meet some of the institutional criteria advanced by the neocorpora-
tist literature for the success of concertation schemes. The structure and organization of 
Spanish economic actors, especially its labor unions, did not foresee the successful im-
plementation of social concertation agreements in this country. Union membership rates 
in Spain are among the lowest in the OECD, and they are far lower than the rates of un-
ionization of traditional neocorporatist countries, such as Sweden.  
At the same time, Spain does not have the monopolistic and encompassing un-
ions that exist in other countries such as Germany, Austria, or Sweden. In Spain the 
labor movement is dominated by two major confederations: UGT and CCOO, which com-
pete for worker support. The number of workers covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments is high (over 60 percent), and the industrial relations setting is characterized by 
three-tier bargaining, which occurs at the central, sectoral, and firm levels. Most work-
ers, however, are covered by agreements negotiated at the sectoral level. Therefore, 
Spain is often labeled as a country with an “intermediate” system of wage bargaining, 
more centralized than the ones existing in countries such as France or Britain, but less so 
than the systems prevalent in Austria or Sweden.    7 
Table 1: Main Social Pacts, Content, and Leading Signatories, 1977-2004 
AGREEMENT YEARS  SIGNATORIES  MAIN 
CONTENT 
Moncloa Pacts  1977  Government and 
political parties 
Incomes policy 
Basic Interconfederal Agreement (ABI)  1979  CEOE-UGT  Labor regulations 
Framework Interconfederal Agreement 
(AMI) 
1980−1  CEOE-UGT-USO Incomes  policy 
National Employment Agreement (ANE)  1982  CEOE-UGT-CCOO-
government 
Incomes policy 
Interconfederal Agreement (AI)  1983 CEOE-UGT-CCOO  Incomes  policy 
Social and Economic Agreement (AES)  1985−6  CEOE-UGT-
Government 
CEOE-UGT 
Incomes policy 
Interconfederal Agreement to Regulate 
Labor Ordinances.  
1994  CEOE, CCOO UGT  Labor regulations 
Agreement to set up institutions to 
supervise the implementation of the 1994 
pact.  
1996 CEOE,  CCOO  UGT  Implementation 
mechanisms 
Agreement to increase risk prevention in 
the workplace 
1996  CEOE, CCOO UGT  Safety rules 
Agreement to boost social provisions for 
rural employment. 
1996  CEOE, CCOO UGT  Employment in 
rural areas 
Tripartite Agreement for the Extra-
Judicial Resolution of Labor Conflicts 
(ASEC) 
1996  CEOE, CCOO UGT  Resolution of labor 
disputes 
Agreement on pension reform.   1996  CCOO, UGT and the 
government 
Pension system 
Tripartite Agreement on Professional 
Training and Continuing Education 
1996 CEOE,  CCOO  UGT  Professional 
training 
Interconfederal Agreement for 
Employment Stability (AIEE). 
1997  CEOE, CCOO UGT  Reduction of 
temporary 
contracts 
Interconfederal Agreement on Collective 
Bargaining 
1997  CEOE, CCOO UGT  Articulation of 
collective 
bargaining 
Interconfederal Agreement on Coverage 
Gaps 
1997  CEOE, CCOO UGT  Labor ordinances 
Agreement over Part-Time Work.   1997  CCOO, UGT and the 
government 
Promotion of part-
time contracts 
Agreement to incentive stable labor 
contracts & penalize temporary ones 
1998  CCOO and the 
government 
Reduction of 
temporary 
contracts 
Agreement to increase certain minimum 
Social Security pensions 
1999  CCOO, UGT and the 
government 
Increase pensions 
Pact to constitute the Foundation for the 
Prevention of Labor Risks 
1999  CCOO, UGT and the 
government 
Health and safety 
in the workplace 
III Agreement on Continuous Training.   2000  The government, 
CCOO, UGT, CIG, and 
CEOE 
Training 
II Agreement for the Extra judicial 
Resolution of Labor Conflicts (ASEC II) 
2001  CEOE, CCOO, UGT  Resolution of labor 
disputes 
New agreement on pensions and social 
protection. 
2001  CCOO, UGT and the 
government 
Pension system 
Interconfederal Agreement for Collective  2001  CEOE, CCOO, UGT  Wage bargaining   8 
Bargaining 2002.  framework 
Interconfederal Agreement for Collective 
Bargaining 2003 
2003  CEOE, CCOO, UGT  Wage bargaining 
framework 
Interconfederal Agreement for Collective 
Bargaining 2004 
2003  CEOE, CCOO, UGT  Wage bargaining 
framework 
Competitiveness, Stable Employment, and 
Social Cohesion (Joint Declaration) 
2004 Government,  CEOE, 
CEPYME, CCOO, UGT 
Framework for 
social dialogue  
CEOE: Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales, CCOO: Comisiones Obreras, UGT: Unión General 
de Trabajadores; CEPYME: Confederación Española de Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas. 
 
Furthermore, the institutional setting in Spain differs in several important 
respects from liberal and coordinated market economies common in other OECD coun-
tries. Like other European countries (such as France or Italy), Spain has transformed its 
economic management system over the last three decades through reforms that borrow 
from both models of capitalism, but the state and state actors continue to play an im-
portant role. Spain conforms to a large extent to the so-called “state capitalism” model 
(Schmidt 2002: 141-46), in which the government is still a major institutional actor and 
leads business-labor relations, even after the processes of liberalization and integration 
into the European Union in the 1980s-1990s. Indeed, the Spanish government remains an 
important actor actively involved in the resolution of coordination problems among eco-
nomic actors. It intervenes in technology transfer, allocation of credit, and the labor mar-
ket. In addition, the financial system is not particularly conducive to the long-term fi-
nancing of companies or the financing of new entrepreneurship initiatives; the industrial 
relations system does not always allow for cooperative industrial relations within firms 
and coordinated wage bargaining across companies; and the educational and training 
systems do not foster training for young people or incremental skill acquisition, in 
which firms may be closely involved. Finally, the inter-company system does not gener-
ally facilitate technology and standard setting cooperation among companies.  
 
Table 2: Trade Union Membership in Spain, 1993-20033 
Spain      1993 1998 2003  Change  93-03 
CCOO.    654,000 713,000 958,000 +46.9% 
UGT  740,000 796,000 944,000 +27.6% 
USO Na  72,000  106,000  +47.2%* 
CGT Na  Na  100,000   
ELA-STV Na  Na  103.596**   
Total Na  Na  2,108,000   
* Change from 1998 to 2003.  
Source: EIRO. ** ELA 
 
This unpropitious institutional setting, however, has not precluded the reemer-
gence of social concertation in Spain over the last decade. On the contrary, coordination 
among economic actors has flourished in Spain as the social actors have developed dis-
tinctive processes of social bargaining to reform social policies and regulate the labor 
                                                           
3Most union members belong to the trade unions listed. However, there are some other organizations such 
as a number of regional trade unions, and the Independent Trade Union Confederation of Public Servants 
(Confederación Sindical Independiente de Funcionarios, CSIF)–for which no membership information is available. 
The data are self-reported by unions.   9 
market. While some scholars (Schmidt 2002: 127) attribute the direction of reform in 
state capitalist countries towards greater coordination to “the relative levels of unioniza-
tion and central organization of employers’ associations and unions,” in Spain the rela-
tive level of unionization and the organization of unions and employers’ organizations 
has not changed significantly over the last decade and unions and employers are not 
much stronger than they were a decade ago. Moreover, unlike Italy, the state has not al-
ways been a central actor in this process and the social actors have reasserted their 
autonomy. This is the central puzzle of this project: How can we account for such develop-
ment? How is it possible that countries that do not have the institutional complementarities that 
characterize “coordinated market economies” have been able to develop coordination mechanisms 
among the economic actors? 
 
The Spanish Case in Comparative Perspective 
The return of social bargaining in Spain was not a unique development. On the 
contrary, throughout the 1980s and 1990s social bargaining resumed in countries like 
Ireland, Italy, and Portugal that also lacked a strong democratic corporatist tradition. 
These countries had a tradition of corporatism derived in part from Roman Catholic so-
cial teachings. As in Spain, in these countries the “inadequate” structure, strength, and 
organization of the economic actors; the lack of a tradition of Social Democratic govern-
ment; and the relatively decentralized structure of wage bargaining did not preclude the 
emergence of social concertation. In all cases unions agreed to participate in social bar-
gaining and entered social pacts for reasons of convenience. Indeed, the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) process, changes in the balance of power among the actors in-
volved, transformations in the economic structure, the inability to curb inflation, or the 
convergence towards an intermediate model, led the social actors to the social bargain-
ing table to confront these challenges (Regini 2000, Rhodes 1998).  
In Portugal social bargaining surged in the mid-1980s and was sustained during 
the last decade (Royo 2002: 89-112). There were three main periods. The first one was 
from 1986 to 1995. This was a decade dominated by the Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco 
Silva, leader of the conservative Social Democratic Party (PSD). His governments con-
ducted an aggressive policy of economic liberalization, privatization, and deregulation 
of the labor market. Dr. Cavaco Silva, however, was also a strong believer in the social 
concertation process, and starting in 1986 he negotiated landmark agreements between 
the unions (mainly UGT) and employers’ associations. His last agreement was the 1992 
“Agreement on Incomes Policy.” The electoral victory of the Portuguese Socialist Party 
(PS) in the 1995 general election marked the beginning of a new political cycle and a new 
phase of social dialogue. The new government vowed to develop and implement its 
policies with the participation of the social actors. The result of this approach was the 
signing of two agreements in 1996, one a short-term pact and the other a strategic agree-
ment that covered the last three years of the legislature (1997−1999). The PS government 
was reelected in 1999 and it continued its negotiations with the social partners within 
the Permanent Council for Social Concertation (CPCS). In 2001 the government and the 
social actors signed two new agreements on professional training and work safety. 
These were the last agreements.   10 
Ireland also provides an interesting case marked by a tendency to deal with in-
dustrial relations issues (including wages) in a centralized way. Since the 1970s almost 
all pay agreements have been either negotiated centrally or have followed a general 
norm. However, the basic relationship between trade unions and employers has been an 
antagonistic one, and the industrial relations system has been characterized by wide-
spread restrictive practices. Large general unions dominate the labor movement, and the 
Irish industrial relations system had historical roots in the British model (although cur-
rent trends are moving it away from this source). Following difficulties reaching and im-
plementing national collective agreements in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, yearly national 
wage agreements started in 1971 and continued through 1978. Over the last three dec-
ades the corporatist trend has been reinforced. The “National Understanding for Eco-
nomic and Social Development” was signed in 1979 covering such issues as wages, taxa-
tion, employment, social welfare and health. This agreement marked a significant de-
parture: for the first time the government became directly involved in national nego-
tiations with the social partners. A second “National Understanding” followed it but 
from 1981 through 1987, there were no centralized agreements. Social bargaining re-
sumed in October of 1987 with the “Program for National Recovery” covering the period 
to the end of 1990, which included industrial relations, social and economic issues, and 
continued in 1990 with the “Program for Economic and Social Progress,” which also in-
cluded specific macroeconomic and industrial policies. Social bargaining continued 
throughout the 1990s. In 1996 the social partners signed the “Partnership 2000 for Inclu-
sion, Employment and Competitiveness,” a program of economic and social policy that 
also included a pay agreement. This agreement consolidated the pattern of agreed na-
tional programs and extended their scope with a new emphasis on inclusion and em-
ployment (Von Prodynski 1999: 63-69). 
In Italy social bargaining has proceeded intermittently. There were incomes pol-
icy agreements in 1977 and 1983. In 1984, however, disagreements among the main trade 
union confederations brought the process to an end. Following a period of fragmenta-
tion that led to bargaining decentralization, national-level negotiations resumed in 1992 
when the unions agreed to abolish the scala mobile and freeze company-level bargaining 
for two years to support the government austerity program. In 1993 they signed a new 
agreement establishing an incomes policy framework based on a two-level bargaining 
structure. In 1998 the Patto di Natale, reaffirmed this framework and introduced Euro-
pean inflation as a referent (Pérez 2002; Regini and Regalia 1997; Rhodes 1998). 
From a theoretical and comparative standpoint what is interesting about these 
countries is that generally speaking they all lacked the kind of encompassing bargaining 
organizations and centralized systems of wage bargaining that characterize successful 
efforts at centralized social bargaining in traditional neocorporatist countries. In this re-
gard, the Spanish case is attractive as a microcosmic example of the dynamics that fol-
low from Europeanization and the attempt to impose monetary discipline in a frag-
mented bargaining context. It helps illustrate ways in which these pressures influence 
the preferences of the social actors. In addition, there are some features that differentiate 
the Spanish experience from that of other these other countries (and from the first phase 
of social concertation in Spain): 
1.  The length of the process: social bargaining resumed in 1993, has ex-
tended over a decade, and continues into the new millennium.   11 
2.  The scope: since 1994 there have been twenty main agreements. 
3.  The content: these agreements have been very ambitious and have cov-
ered multiple issues from pensions, to wages, to labor market regulations. 
4.  The commitment to social bargaining across the partisan divide: social 
dialogue started under a Socialist government in 1993 and continued with 
a conservative party in power. The new socialist government elected in 
2004 has reaffirmed its commitment to this process. 
5.  The endurance: despite setbacks (i.e., the general strike of 2002 over labor 
market reform) social bargaining has continued and new agreements 
have been signed 
6.  The increasing autonomy of the social actors: while the government 
played a central role during the first phase of social concertation, during 
the last decade trade unions and employers associations have been the 
central actors of this process and have reaffirmed their autonomy from 
the government. 
7.  The Spanish model of social bargaining has superseded the traditional 
corporatist exchange based in the extension of social rights in return for 
wage moderation and cooperative industrial relations. These pacts have 
also included other issues such as internal and external flexibility, and 
welfare policies. 
 
The Relevance of the Spanish Case 
The rationale for selecting Spain was based on the following factors: first, Spain 
differs along a range of dependent and independent variables from the LMEs and the 
CMEs, which allows for the evaluation of competing arguments. Second, coordination 
has flourished in Spain, yet there are significant differences in the degree of coordination 
within the country over time. The examination of Spain’s experiences provides numer-
ous comparisons across periods of interactions among business, unions, and the govern-
ment. Finally, historical analysis of the development of coordination over the last two 
decades also provides fertile ground for the examination of causal factors over time. 
The Spanish case offers insights that are relevant to the field of comparative po-
litical economy. There are three main reasons why this country provides an ideal setting 
to study the development of coordinated capacity. First, as we have seen, much of the 
political economy literature has examined differences among the political economies of 
the developed world, and more specifically the so-called “organized” and “liberal” 
economies of Northern Europe, Asia, and North America. This project will highlight one 
of the main shortcomings of these analyses, namely, their failure to account for develop-
ments in countries that do not fit easily into these defined institutional categories. The 
main conclusion of these scholars is that there are two main economic/institutional 
models for firms and countries to respond to the challenges of globalization: the organ-
ized model of the Northern European countries, or the liberal one of the Anglo-
American ones. Given the difficulties of transforming institutional settings to build co-
ordinating capacities, for countries lacking the institutional capacities of the organized 
market economies⎯such as Spain⎯the only alternative would be to follow the Anglo-
Saxon model. This has not been the case in Spain. In this country, the government and   12 
the social actors have attempted to develop new solutions and outcomes based on new 
institutional settings that do not conform to the liberal model.  
The second reason why Spain is an ideal venue for examining the development 
of cooperation capacities is that the Spanish case offers one of the few instances in which 
institutional reforms to build coordination capacity emerged in a context markedly dif-
ferent from that of the small European states of Northern and Central Europe. Spain can-
not be classified as liberal market economies (i.e., like Britain, Australia, or the United 
States), or as organized market economies (i.e., like Germany, Japan, Sweden, Austria, or 
the Netherlands). On the contrary, Spain displays what some authors have referred to as 
a distinctive style of capitalism (Rhodes 1997). Hence, Spain offers an opportunity to 
research the impact of a different institutional setting on economic performance and 
firms’ behavior. 
Finally, analysis of the Spanish experience will show that arguments about the 
demise of national autonomy in the global economy are overdrawn. Increasing foreign 
direct investment, exposure to trade, and liquid capital mobility has not prevented the 
emergence and consolidation of new institutions that facilitate coordination capacities. 
In Spain the social actors faced strong incentives to cushion, through institutional re-
form, the dislocations generated by the integration of the country in the global economy. 
In this country the combined impetuses of globalization and monetary integration pro-
moted, rather than hindered, cooperation and the development of institutional mecha-
nisms that promote cooperation and the provision of collective goods. 
 
Explaining Labor’s Return to Social Bargaining 
The decision by Spanish unions to return to the bargaining table can be seen, for 
the most part, as a defensive strategy motivated by their weakening at the firm level as a 
result of structural and political changes. It was also motivated by their failure to trans-
late their capacity to mobilize workers effectively in response to manpower policies 
aimed at liberalizing the labor market through legislation or government action from 
1989-1993. In Spain, the labor movement failed to translate its unity into effective power 
as manifested in their inability to resist legal reform initiatives aimed at liberalizing the 
labor markets (i.e., the 1994 Reforma Laboral). In other words, with its support for tri-
partite concertation agreements, labor sought to mitigate the decline in its bargaining 
power at the firm and enterprise levels. This section will argue that the changing balance 
of power affected the predisposition of the unions to pursue their strategies through a 
new set of institutions. 
 
Increasing Labor Market Segmentation and Individualization of Labor Relations 
The weakening of trade union organizations at the firm level in Spain is mani-
fested in the relative decline in union density, which hindered unions’ capacity to mobi-
lize workers in response to manpower policies to liberalize the labor market. In Spain, 
following the unraveling of social concertation in 1987 (see Royo 2000), unions found 
themselves in a weak position, with very low membership concentrated in declining in-
dustries, dependent on state funding, and with low contractual powers. The proportion 
of union members in the labor force in Spain declined sharply following the transition to   13 
democracy. Since the early 1980s trade union membership has remained low and 
changes to membership have been mostly caused by structural changes in certain sec-
tors. This downward tendency, however, was reversed in Spain in the 1990s. The net 
union density rate in Spain rose from 13.32 percent in 1990 to 16.38 percent in 1993 (be-
fore falling back to 15.82 percent in 1994), challenging the thesis of union decline in the 
Spanish context (see Jordana 1996). A detailed analysis of this trend, however, reinforces 
the thesis of this article that the trade unions’ weaknesses forced them to seek the sup-
port of new constituencies through a return to national social bargaining.  
First, the economic crisis of the early 1990s, labor rigidities, and the opening of 
the Spanish economy to external competition forced Spanish firms to build new com-
petitive strategies, seeking greater flexibility, mobility, and the externalization of pro-
duction to small non-unionized firms. Product decentralization was reflected in the 
growth in the number of small firms (with under fifty workers), which increased from 
95.1 percent of firms in 1978 to 98.1 percent in 1989, and their share of employment, 
which grew from 38.4 percent to 52.2 percent during the same period in Spain (Fraile 
1999: 280; Richards and Polavieja 1997: 31). According to the Central Directory of Enter-
prises (DIRCE) as of January 1, 2003, there were in Spain 2,808,385 small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs)–defined as enterprises that employ between 0-249 workers. This 
represents 99.87 percent of the business census in Spain (a total of 2,813,120 enterprises, 
excluding agriculture and fisheries). According to the European Observatory of SMEs, in 
2000 the average size of Spanish enterprises, which represent around 13.5 percent of the 
European total, was five workers (in Europe the average is six, and only Italy with three 
and Greece with two have lower averages). Since 1985, the first year that the National 
Statistic Institute (INE) started to compile the DIRCE, the number of SMEs has increased by 
511,688 productive units, and between 1995 and 2003 the number has grown 22 percent. 
The most productive period has been between 2001 and 2003 when 167,626 new SMEs 
have been created (a 6 percent growth). In 2004 there are 6.7 SMEs per 100 inhabitants, 
14.8 per 100 active workers; and 16.7 per 100 employed. Most of the SMEs operate in the 
service and commerce sectors (real state, tourism, minority trade, food, social services, 
education, health, and beverages). In these sectors the level of unionization was only 
half that in all manufacturing, reflecting the small size of most firms and the prominence 
of professional and technical staff (in 2001 31.7 percent of Spanish worked in manage-
ment positions classified as technical managers and medium level professionals, while 
only 11.2 percent were classified as working in positions that did not require qualifi-
cations). In addition, most of the new jobs have been created in the service sector (em-
ployment in the service sector grew from 7.4 million people in 1991 to over 10.5 million 
people in 2003), and construction (from 1.3 million in 1991 to 2 millions in 2003): 
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          Figure 1: Evolution of Employment by Economic Sectors, 1991-2003 (000, Annual 
Average) 
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 Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa 
 
These are sectors in which unions have had difficulties increasing affiliation: 
 
Table 3: Union Density (%) by Sector 1991-97 
Sector  1997 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Agriculture  9.4  12.6 12.6 13.6 11.8 12.0 11.3 
Mining, Manufacturing, 
Utilities 
21.8 23.4 27.4 27.3 25.6 25.2 24.3 
Construction  9.6  11.7 13.8 13.6 11.5 11.3 10.7 
Commerce  6.3 7.7 7.8 7.4 6.7 6.5 6.4 
Transport and 
Communications 
31.9 36.3 38.4 38.0 34.6 33.3 31.9 
Finance and Business Services  20.0 22.1 23.0 23.7 20.5 19.9 20.2 
Public and Private Services  10.0 11.2 12.6 13.1 13.5 13.6 13.7 
Total  16.1 18.1 19.8 19.5 18.2 17.8 17.8 
Source: Van Der Meer 2000. Data from: UGT, CCOO, CSI-CSIF, ELA-STV, and CIG.  
 
The combination of all of these factors led to the increasing individualization of 
labor relations, contributed to lower labor costs, and gave firms more flexibility in the 
organization of work and in the deployment of labor through mobility, overtime,4 
rotation and part-time work. 
 
                                                           
4Overtime work is still a significant component or working time among Spanish workers and firms: in 2003 
70 percent of the collective bargain agreements included clauses on overtime. More than 35 percent of these 
pacts established monetary compensation for overtime, and 45 percent of them compensated more for over-
time hours than for regular ones. See CES, 2004: 346.   15 
Table 4: Wage earners and Occupied in Part-time Work5 
Year Occupied  Wage-earners 
  Thousands  % of Total  Thousands  % of Total 
1996  982.8 7.7 709.6 7.3 
1997  1,050.7 7.9  794.7  7.8 
1998  1,074.5 7.8  838.9  7.9 
1999  1,158.6 8.0  928.7  8.1 
2000  1,214.8 7.9  986.9  8.0 
2001  1,266.6 7.9 1,036.8 8.1 
2002  1,277.8 7.9 1,077.3 8.2 
2003  1,336.4 8.0 1,129.3 8.3 
Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa 
 
In addition, this individualization of employment relations, which threatens un-
ions’ organizational future, was further hastened by the spectacular growth of tempo-
rary employment. From 1984 through 1997 the number of temporary contracts increased 
from 7.5 percent to 39 percent of the total. Subsequently the level of temporary work 
among new workers in Spain rose from 61 percent in 1987 to 81.5 percent in 1990, doub-
ling the proportion of the active population on temporary contracts during that period 
from 15 percent to 30 percent, (and accounting for 90 percent of all employment con-
tracts). In addition, almost 50 percent of the staff is temporary in small firms, and the 
country has the highest level of temporary work in the EU⎯currently 33.69 percent of 
the salaried workforce (see Bentolila, Segura, and Toharia 1991: 237−38; Richards and 
Polavieja 1997: 13−23).6  
 
Table 5: Workers by Contract Type, 1996-2003, (000) 
Type 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Indefinite  6,383.5 6,724.5 7,125.7 7,697.6 8,354.7 8,735.4 9,066.7 9,440.9 
Temporary  3,273.4 3,396.3 3,525.6 3,776.8 3,931.1 4,051.4 4,075.1 4,156.9 
Temporary 
Level* 
33.9 33.5 33.1 32.9 32.0 31.7 31.0 30.6 
* Temporary level as a percentage of temporary workers of all workers. 
Source: INE, Encuesta de Población Activa 
 
The increasing level of temporality had clear effects on workers’ involvement 
with the unions and it had profound consequences on the structure of the labor market, 
                                                           
5The number of part time-workers has remained stable in Spain at around 8 percent. In comparison the 
average in the EU is 18 percent. Only a fifth of those who work part-time in Spain (81.5 percent of them 
women) would not rather have a full-time job. The reason for this has to do with the fact the jobs involved 
are mostly poorly paid, have little social recognition, and require low qualifications. Seventy percent of 
these jobs are in services and most of them temporary. Home service (maids) is the sector in which this kind 
of employment is the most popular, with 49 percent of the employed working part-time. See EIRO 2003; and 
CES 2004: 218-20. 
6Despite the efforts from the trade unions, fixed-term employment has remained persistently high, and it is 
increasing in the public sector where it represented over 20 percent of all employment in 2003. One of the 
reasons is the high rate of turnover experienced by temporary workers (in abuse of the law): in 1994 each 
temporary worker had signed an average of two contracts per year, but in recent years the figure was three. 
Half of the temporary contracts have a duration of less than a month. See EIRO, 2003 Annual Review for Spain.   16 
leading to a growing segmentation of workers between insiders (workers on permanent 
contracts with more stable, secure, and long-term prospects) and the unemployed and 
outsiders (workers on temporary contracts in a more precarious situation) (Richards and 
Polavieja 1997: 32−39).7 Labor segmentation provided a buffer that insulated permanent 
workers from layoffs, allowing them to bargain for higher wages, and led to a two-tier 
labor force, thus accentuating the insider-outsider division within the national work-
force. In addition, increasing segmentation was accentuated by industrial restructuring, 
which led to the closure of large plants and caused massive layoffs, thus shrinking fur-
ther the manufacturing sector⎯traditionally the source of union strength (i.e., in 1995 
only 18 percent of CCOO’s members were temporary workers at a time when 34 percent 
of Spanish workers were temporary; see Jordana 1996: 21−22). 
These developments were particularly worrisome for Spanish unions because 
they constrained their bargaining strength and deprived them of members, threatening 
their survival. Therefore they decided that they had to counter them. In the end, the 
combination of high unemployment and the large number of temporary workers, 
coupled with changes in the occupational structure and the individualization of employ-
ment relations, forced Spanish unions to reassess their approaches. Union leaders real-
ized that if they wanted to bridge the divide between insiders and outsiders and extend 
their influence beyond their core constituency, they had to develop a new strategy with 
a general commitment to the reduction of unemployment and the promotion of greater 
job security. In other words, with these new agreements unions sought to counter the 
conventional wisdom that views them as entrenched institutions that promote the in-
terests of insiders (see Jimeno and Toharia 1993; Bentolila and Dolado 1994), while help-
ing to improve macroeconomic conditions that would contribute to economic recovery. 
This led them to develop a broader strategy with which to tackle unemployment and 
promote job stability through national social bargaining with the government and/or 
employers.  
In order to achieve these objectives, unions refocused their attention on the firms 
to increase membership. They also developed unitary bargaining platforms that focused 
on certain strategic areas⎯temporary contracts, unemployment, work organization, 
training, information rights, and health and safety⎯aimed at bridging the divide be-
tween insiders and outsiders. These platforms would be the objective of national bar-
gaining with employers and/or the government and would lead to the reemergence of 
national social bargaining. This new approach signaled a strategic shift on the part of the 
unions, which were now willing to accept more internal flexibility in the organization 
and deployment of labor within the workplace, in exchange for greater employment sta-
bility (Fraile 1999: 297-99).8  
                                                           
7Richards and Polavieja show that labor market precariousness reduces union involvement because it seri-
ously impedes collective action, and it produces sentiments and attitudes of apathy toward unions. They 
conclude that temporary workers neither identify with, nor feel represented by the unions. In addition, they 
report that temporary workers are less likely to have access to wage-related benefits, earn lower wages (ap-
proximately 10 percent less than permanent workers), are not entitled to as many welfare benefits. They suf-
fer harsher working conditions, are more likely to suffer accidents, and have fewer possibilities for promo-
tion and for the acquisition of skills. 
8See interview with Cándido Méndez, Secretary General of UGT, in El País, “La reforma laboral no ha produ-
cido ningún efecto positivo,” Friday, October 27, 1995, p.58. See also “Los sindicatos proponen hoy a la   17 
In this regard the 1997 Interconfederal Agreement for Employment Stability ( AIEE) 
was a direct response to the dramatic increase of temporary workers in Spain since the 
1984 reform of the Workers' Statute.9 In a context of relatively high dismissal costs, em-
ployers had been using these contracts as instruments to introduce flexibility and to be 
able to adapt their labor force to market conditions and demand. They recognized, how-
ever, the perverse consequences of this development (Jiménez Aguilar 1997: 12−13).10 
Hence, the view that a new regulation of permanent contracts was needed in order to in-
crease employment stability and minimize the increasing segmentation of the labor mar-
ket gained support among employer and union leaders. Although at the beginning of 
the bargaining process the negotiating platform introduced by the unions did not in-
clude this new approach, the negotiating process and the final agreement demonstrated 
the unions’ new strategic outlook. In reference to this new strategy CCOO stated that: 
Bargaining with the CEOE, on the one hand, and with the Govern-
ment, on the other, appears from the outset as a strategic challenge for the 
future of the syndical movement. To be able to respond to workers’ de-
mands, and to do so guaranteeing that the union gains contractual capa-
bilities, are essential questions. Therefore the first task, chronologically 
and quantitatively, was to give impetus to a multidimensional bargaining 
process. A process born out of the syndical initiative, which responds to 
the need to address the problems of the less favored groups, and that at 
the same time, reinforces the strategy of unity of action with UGT.  
This process was born on May 9, 1996, in response to the direc-
tives from the Sixth Congress, which led the union to focus on the im-
provement of employment conditions and collective bargaining as prior-
ity objectives, and also as part of the campaign “For stable employment 
and with rights” launched in the first months of that year. In sum, [we de-
veloped this process] with the objective to influence employment condi-
tions, which currently due to the high levels unemployment, temporality, 
and turnout deepen the differences in working conditions among differ-
ent collectives, provoke a social cohesion deficit, fragment industrial rela-
tions, promote disloyal business competition based in lower labor costs, 
and relegate quality as a secondary source of competitiveness (CCOO 2000: 
24-25). 
 
Pressures to Articulate Further the Collective Bargaining System 
Management recourse to manpower policies based upon unstable, fixed-term 
contracts led to the appearance of contradictory tendencies in the labor market. While 
average real wages grew moderately, a tight labor market in some areas of rapid em-
                                                                                                                                                                             
patronal CEOE el reparto del empleo y medidas contra la precariedad laboral,” in El País, Thursday, May 9, 
1996.  
9It was also the result of the frustration of the social actors with the 1994 labor reform. See “Patronal y sin-
dicatos negocian medidas para crear empleo estable porque la reforma laboral no funciona,” in El País, Fri-
day, May 10, 1996.  
10One of the leaders of the CEOE, Jiménez Aguilar, has recognized that the increasing segmentation of the 
labor market between permanent and temporary workers “hinders workers’ professional training, their mo-
tivation, and in sum the competitiveness of the firm and the quality of its products.”   18 
ployment growth (particularly in the case of services, banking, and insurance) led to in-
creasing bargaining power in favor of certain workers who were willing to negotiate 
apart from the collective bargaining process (Stoleroff 1992: 138). At the same time, it 
was also very significant that the sectors that came to take much of the lead in wage-
setting were ones over which the national unions had lower levels of control. (i.e., the 
service and construction sectors) (Pérez 1998: 17). In addition, as we have seen in the ser-
vice sector the level of unionization was only half that in all manufacturing, reflecting 
the small size of most firms (see Richards and Polavieja 1997). These developments were 
reinforced by the economic crisis of the early 1990s, which resulted in sharp increases in 
unemployment, and further eroded labor’s capacity at the level of firm and branch col-
lective bargaining. All these changes increased pressures on unions to seek a new articu-
lation of collective bargaining that would allow them to retake the initiative in the wage-
setting process.  
Pressures to seek a new articulation of the collective bargaining system were has-
tened by the termination of the remaining labor ordinances. The 1994 Labor Reform, 
which also broadened the content of collective bargaining, repealed the labor ordinances 
and gave the social actors freedom (with certain limits) to negotiate new terms of em-
ployment (e.g., work shifts, labor mobility, wages, working conditions, training, func-
tional mobility, job classifications, promotions, technological innovation, and changes in 
the organizations of work) previously regulated by law. In other words, the reform 
shifted powers to the market. In a competitive context marked by intensive firm restruc-
turing in which issues of work flexibility played a critical role, some employers pushed 
for a legal framework that would facilitate the individualization of employment rela-
tions and the marginalization of work councils.11  
 
Figure 2: The Role of Works Councils in Spain according to the Workers’ Statute: 
- Monitor the implementation of labor laws, social security, employment, and health and safety 
regulations, and conditions of work established by agreement or custom and practice. 
Verify that they are applied correctly;  
- Take the appropriate legal steps in pertinent cases;  
- Participate in welfare measures for workers and their families organized by the company based 
on collective agreements;  
- Work together with management to ensure the fulfillment of productivity targets;  
- Inform the workforce of changes or developments might that may affect them.  
- Conclude company or workplace agreements  
- Call a strike in the establishment in which they operate 
Source: EIRO  
 
                                                           
11During an interview with Antonio Moreno, Secretary of Industrial Relations of the CEOE, in May of 2003, 
he stressed that some employers prefer unilateral reforms from the government because they perceive that 
they may be faster and deeper. He indicated, for instance, that in 1997 Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, the 
CEOE’s territorial organization in Catalonia, was critical of the 1997 agreement. They would have preferred 
an imposed solution from the government that would have introduced a new contract with lower and fixed 
dismissals costs. He also stressed that although the CEOE supported the articulation of collective bargaining 
and resisted the PP’s attempts to reform unilaterally the existing system, many of their affiliates were push-
ing for decentralization and wanted the government to impose the reform.   19 
This development put pressure on unions to get back to the bargaining table to 
stem this threat. With their support for these macro agreements labor sought to relieve 
the decline in its bargaining power at the workplace level, and to regain the initiative in 
the collective bargaining process, while mitigating the difficulties that they were facing 
in organizing workers in the workplace. With the agreement of 1997, the union leaders 
supported publicly the need to strengthen the collective bargaining system and to foster 
collective bargaining within the enterprises.12 CCOO included this goal as part of its ra-
tionale for pursuing social bargaining: “…with the objective to influence the collective 
bargaining system debilitated due to the existing coverage gaps, as well as the excessive 
atomization, and the disarticulation that currently exist” (CCOO 2000: 25). 
 
The Failure of Confrontational Strategies 
The strategic shift in favor of centralized social bargaining was also motivated by 
the unions’ failure to translate their unity into effective power as manifested in their in-
ability to resist legal reform initiatives aimed at liberalizing the labor market. Union 
leaders came to the conclusion that their confrontational strategies were eroding their in-
fluence in the policymaking process and support from their constituencies. 
With the organization (and the massive success) of the 1988 general strike, the 
two main confederations (UGT and CCOO) solidified a new strategy based on three pil-
lars: unity of action, the abandonment of social concertation, and the appeal to new con-
stituencies to broaden their bases of support (see Fraile 1999: 286−87). The Socialist gov-
ernment, shocked by the success of the strike, shelved the youth employment plan that 
had triggered the strike, increased wages for public sector employees and pensioners to 
compensate for the 1988 deviation in targeted inflation, and signed an agreement with 
the unions in 1990 on pensions, unemployment benefits, public-sector wages, minimum 
wages, and bargaining rights for public-sector workers. The success of the strike allowed 
unions to regain a role in the political arena, which helped them to reverse their organi-
zational decline. They were unable, however, to reverse the government’s manpower 
policy initiatives.  
In the early 1990s, the struggle between the unions and the government centered 
on ways to achieve the Masstricht criteria for EMU membership. The Socialists’ conver-
gence plan led to two more general strikes. The first one, which occurred in May 1992, 
took place over the so-called decretazo⎯a government decree establishing cuts in unem-
ployment coverage, which reduced the amount and length of benefits, tightened eligibil-
ity conditions, and increased the required period of work to collect benefits from six 
months to one year. The second one took place in January 1994 over a government pro-
posal to reform labor laws that sought to make working conditions flexible and increase 
the scope of collective bargaining. The 1994 reform removed restrictions on mobility, de-
centralized collective bargaining, eased dismissals (it broadened the dismissal causes to 
include organizational, technological, and productive reasons), legalized temp agencies, 
repealed the remaining labor ordinances by 1995, and expanded the types of temporary 
contracts (it introduced a new “apprenticeship contract” for young workers under 
twenty-five, and a new flexible part-time contract free of payroll taxes). The reaction of 
                                                           
12See quotes in Espina (1999, p. 394) with interview with Antonio Gutiérrez in ABC April 27, 1997 and with 
Cándido Méndez in La Vanguardia on November 1, 1996.   20 
the unions to the unilateral reforms of the government was to try force its hand through 
the intensification of industrial conflict and the increasing politicization of their strate-
gies. At the same time, they attempted to derail the implementation of the reforms dur-
ing collective bargaining, intensified industrial conflict, and organized general strikes. 
Although the general strikes were successful (for instance between three and five million 
workers supported the January 1994 strike in Spain) and the unions demonstrated, once 
again, their mobilization capacity, they had limited political impact and the government 
reforms were finally enacted. Indeed, increasing mobilization and union unity in Spain 
did not lead to labor victories.  
 
Table 5: Industrial Conflict in Spain, 1990−2003 
Year  Number of Strikes  Number of Participants (000)  Days Lost 
(000) 
1990  1,231 864  2,442 
1991  1,552 1,944  4,421 
1992  1,296 5,169  6,247 
1993  1,131 997  2,013 
1994*  890 5,428  6,255 
1995  866 570  1,443 
1996  807 1,078  1,553 
1997  670 577  1,529 
1998  618 672  1,264 
1999  739 1,125  1,477 
2000  727 2,061  3,577 
2002*  729 1,242  1,917 
2002  684 4,528  4,938 
2003  674 728  789 
* Include general strikes 
Sources:  CES:  España, Memoria Sobre la Situacion Socioeconómica y Laboral. Various years. Data from: MTSS: 
Estadísticas de Huelgas y Cierres Patronales, and MTAS: Boletin de Estadísticas Laborales. 
 
Unions also tried to influence the electoral process. In successive elections union 
leaders, who felt they had a responsibility to alter the parliamentary balance, called for a 
punishing vote against the government to pressure it to give in to their demands (see 
Espina 1999). This strategy, however, was not translated into political successes in the 
electoral arena. On the contrary, the parliamentary elections that followed the general 
strikes in the 1980s led to the reelection of the incumbent government up to 1996 (the 
Socialist Party, PSOE, won twice⎯in 1989 and 1993). The failure of this strategy demon-
strates that manifestations of opposition against specific governmental policies on the 
part of the citizens are not incompatible with electoral support for the government that 
has adopted these policies.13 
In the end, this confrontational strategy failed to influence policy outcomes, and 
higher wage demands and industrial conflict contributed to deteriorating economic con-
                                                           
13Some scholars have argued that voters behaved like rational actors and recognized that general strikes 
were not the appropriate venue for adopting and changing important political decisions (see Espina 1999, 
380-83; Boix 1998). According to Espina, this development demonstrates the structural separation between 
the political and industrial relations systems.   21 
ditions and higher unemployment. At the same time, such confrontational strategy left 
unions virtually outside of the policymaking process, with little influence over the 
course of the reforms. The failure of Spanish unions to stop labor law reform and force a 
political crisis through continued social mobilization forced them to reevaluate their 
strategies and adopt a more conciliatory stance that included resuming partial tripartite 
agreements with the government and the CEOE. The CCOO’s leader recognized the limits 
of confrontational strategies when he stated that general strikes “are very extreme in-
struments of syndical action, very strong, as well as very difficult to manage, and to fol-
low up the day after.”14 By promoting centralized bargaining and a new articulation of 
the collective bargaining system, they were making sure that peak confederations would 
remain significant players. José María Fidalgo, the CCOO leader, confirmed, “we are 
coming from a very conflictive period in which we have achieved very few of our objec-
tives despite successive general strikes. From CCOO’s perspective we are interested in 
social bargaining because imposed reforms erode the power and influence of the union. 
They also eliminate rights that later on are very difficult to recover. Therefore, we do not 
want to be spectators, but instead ‘jump into the airplane cabin,’ and participate in the 
changes. We want to participate and fulfill a social function that will legitimate our 
role.”15 Antonio Ferrer, a member of the UGT’s Executive Committee, confirmed that: 
“we want to participate in the policymaking process and influence labor and socio-
political issues.”16 
 
Internal Changes Within Unions 
This strategic shift was further hastened by the internal changes experienced by 
the two main confederations, with the UGT attempting to turn the page on the union’s 
involvement in a corruption scandal, and the CCOO trying to overcome internal ideo-
logical differences. These problems led in both unions to the emergence of new leader-
ship that sought to strengthen the unity of action strategy while resuming partial agree-
ments with the government and the employers’ association. Between 1994 and 1996 
there was a dramatic transformation of the union landscape motivated by the results of 
the work council elections and internal changes within each major trade union confed-
eration. 
As we have seen, following the general strike of 1988, Nicolás Redondo, the 
UGT’s secretary general, and the group of leaders that supported him, decided to pursue 
a confrontational strategy against the government. This decision was motivated by their 
disenchantment with the Socialist government policies and their conviction that their 
previous moderate stance had not benefited workers (Royo 2000). This strategic shift co-
incided with the election of Antonio Gutiérrez as secretary general of CCOO in the Con-
gress that took place in November of 1987. As a result of his election, the more radical 
sector, led by Antonio Moreno, lost hegemony within the union. This sector, however, 
retained significant power until the 1992 Congress, because it still controlled secretariats 
like employment, institutional relations, and collective bargaining. Gutiérrez, who repre-
sented a more modern and moderating outlook, came to power with the commitment to 
                                                           
14See interview with José María Fidalgo in El País, Sunday, April 22 2001. He restated this point during the 
interview that I had with him in May of 2001. 
15Interview with the author on 5/7/2001. 
16Interview with the author on 5/7/2001.   22 
reestablish the “unity of action” with the UGT. Consequently, between 1988 and 1991, co-
inciding with a period of economic expansion, the unions followed a confrontational 
stance and refused to negotiate centralized agreements, giving instead the initiative in 
wage negotiations to their sectoral federations. 
One of the main consequences of these developments was the increasing auton-
omy of unions from the political parties. The UGT had followed the Socialist Party, 
PSOE’s, lead after the party’s victory in the 1982 elections and had subordinated the in-
terests of the union to those of the party. For instance, some of the UGT’s leaders were 
elected to Congress under the PSOE lists. However, the general strike of December of 
1998 drove a wedge between the party and the union that culminated in the final break-
down in the relationship (Gillespie 1990). The Communist Party, PCE (and later on Izqui-
erda Unida, a coalition of leftist parties that included the PCE) still exercised considerable 
influence within the CCOO. The election of Gutiérrez, who supported an autonomous 
stance from the PCE/IU, would start to change this dynamic. By the mid 1990s, the pro-
cess of separation between unions and political parties was a reality (Royo 2000). 
The unwillingness of the unions to negotiate with the government during the 
economic crisis of 1992-1993 led the Socialist government to issue a unilateral labor re-
form in 1994 motivated by the need to confront that dramatic surge in unemployment 
(over 20 percent). The reaction of the trade unions to the unilateral labor reform of 1994 
illustrates the micro debates that took place within the labor movement. Within the 
CCOO the confrontational group, led by Moreno, presented a report (supported by Izqui-
erda Unida) to the Confederal Council of the union on February 1994 in which they pro-
posed an all-out confrontation with the socialist government. This report concluded that 
the alliance between the socialists and the nationalist parties had led to conservative 
policies that had to be confronted head-on by the union in order to fulfill its mission. 
This was a continuation of the confrontational stance of the previous years. With this 
strategy they sought to complement the political opposition of Izquierda Unida (now led 
by Julio Anguita) against the socialists. Gutiérrez, who was becoming increasingly con-
vinced of the futility of this strategy, and wanted to strengthen the autonomy of the 
union vis-à-vis IU, opposed this view. The defeat of CCOO in the 1986 and 1990 syndical 
elections had already given him the opportunity to advance more moderating positions 
within the union,17 and he had initiated the strategic shift in favor of social bargaining 
during the CCOO Congress of 1992, when the minority sector (which supported the con-
frontational stance advocated by the UGT) lost further weight within the union. 
The results of the 1994-1995 syndical elections however, provoked a cataclysm 
within both unions. In Spain the work council elections determine the representative-
ness of unions, which happen to be the only institutions with the legal capacity to bar-
gain at levels above the firm. This system provides a great deal of autonomy to the un-
ion confederations because their strength is not determined by the number of affiliates 
but, instead, by the number of votes that they receive in these elections. They provided a 
test of workers’ support for the confrontational unitary strategies that unions had started 
in 1988. The results of the 1994-1995 syndical elections, however, showed workers’ dis-
                                                           
17His interpretation of the situation was that moderation had led UGT to electoral victories, while confronta-
tion had led CCOO to the erosion of its electoral support among workers. Interview with author December 
1996.   23 
content with this strategy: the UGT and CCOO lost almost 40,000 work council delegates 
(out of the 186,500 delegates that had been elected from both unions in 1990, or 6.5 per-
centage points compared with the elections of 1990). In addition, the UGT, which had 
been the winner of the previous syndical elections in 1986 and 1990 (at a time when the 
union supported a more moderate strategy), lost its dominant position in favor of CCOO, 
which emerged as the victor (CCOO won 37.8 percent of the delegates, and UGT, losing 
7.3 percentage points from the previous elections, won 34.7 percent). Another worrisome 
development for the unions was the fact that only 203,002 syndical delegates were ac-
tually elected, out of a possible 433,946. This meant that the number of workers’ repre-
sentatives elected was below 50 percent, and that more than half of the enterprises (par-
ticularly small and medium enterprises) would not have workers’ representatives.18 
Finally, and this may be the most significant factor, in large companies with more than 
250 workers, nonsyndical candidates registered a spectacular advance (a 20 percent 
gain) with 15,708 delegates (UGT won 11,204 and declined 19.3 percent, and CCOO 14,912, 
and declined 8.6 percent). As Espina (1999, 386−87) indicates, the workers’ message was 
obvious: they opposed the confrontational strategy of the main labor confederations, 
and by voting for nonsyndical candidates, Spanish workers supported a strategy more 
centered on the specific problems of the firms.19 These surprising results raised the 
potential of an alternative to the traditional unions, which provoked a serious alarm in 
the union leadership and led them to reconsider their strategies. 
 
Table 6: Elections to the Work Councils, 1978−95 
UNIONS  1978    1980 1982 1986 1990 1995* 
CCOO  34.57 30.86 33.40 34.54 36.9  37.79 
UGT  21.70 29.27 36.70 40.92 42.0  34.92 
USO  3.77 8.68 4.6  3.80 2.9  3.68 
ELA-STV  0.90 2.20 3.30 2.92 3.2  3.62 
INTG/CIG  ⎯  1.20 1.20 1.20 1.5  1.76 
Other 
Unions 
20.80 12.20 8.70  9.95  7.1  - 
Nonunion  18.13 14.60 12.10 7.6  3.8  3.27 
*Since 1994 the elections do not take place during a three-month period like before. Instead it is an open pro-
cess, although most of the elections take place during the last three months of the four-year period. The last 
electoral period started on July 1, 2000 and lasted though December 31st, 2003. 
Sources: Data from the Ministerio de Trabajo and Seguridad Social and Confederación de CCOO. 
 
The results of the 1994-1995 syndical elections proved that the confrontational 
strategy would not pay off electorally and also that that the unions risked further ero-
sion if they continued on this path. They validated the position of moderating groups 
within both trade unions and gave them the opportunity to seize the initiative and 
change the policy stance. In this new context, the leadership of the CCOO, led by Gutiér-
rez, which had been pushing for a more moderate stance in the 1987 and 1992 union 
                                                           
18See El Mundo, Saturday, December 9, 1995, p. 33: “CCOO desplaza a UGT como primera fuerza sindical y 
crece el apoyo a los nacionalistas.” 
19For an analysis of the impact of these electoral results on UGT’s strategies, see the interview with Cándido 
Méndez, Secretary General of UGT, in El País, “La reforma laboral no ha producido ningun efecto positivo.” 
Friday, October 27, 1995, p. 58.   24 
congresses, used these electoral results in the 1996 CCOO Congress as evidence of the 
need to shift the union strategy in support of a more consensus-based strategy that 
would focus on labor and industrial problems and leave behind a political agenda (see 
Espina 1999: 386−87). This push allowed Gutiérrez to marginalize the minority sector 
within the union that still supported a confrontational strategy (it had the support of 
about 30 percent of the union), and to exclude it from the main executive positions with-
in the union.20 The defeat of this faction led to a strategic shift in favor of social bar-
gaining and the resurgence of social pacts. 
In the UGT this debate took place at a time when Nicolás Redondo was planning 
to retire from the UGT as a result of internal problems, a development that would present 
an opportunity for the more moderate faction within the UGT to take control. The 1995 
Congress elected a new more moderate leader, Cándido Méndez, who had not been di-
rectly involved in the confrontation between the UGT and the PSOE’s leaderships. This 
Congress witnessed a confrontation between the supporters of the ongoing confronta-
tional strategy and other sectors of the union, led by the industry federations, which 
supported a more constructive and pragmatist strategy. This internal struggle finished 
with the incorporation of a significant number of delegates from the latter sectors, which 
shifted the balance of power within the executive bodies in favor of moderation.21  
The debate within the CCOO about social bargaining and the strategic direction of 
the union raged on into the new millennium. The CCOO held its seventh Congress in 
April 2000 and elected José María Fidalgo as Gutiérrez’s successor (the latter could not 
run for reelection after twelve year at the helm due to term limits). The selection of 
Fidalgo, with Gutiérrez’s support, was not without controversy. The secretary of the 
metalworkers’ federation, Ignacio Fernández Toxo, had also wished to present his candi-
dacy. Fidalgo won with 70 percent of the votes but was unable to win the support of the 
minority group that still promoted a more radical strategy and did not want Fidalgo to 
continue the policies of his predecessor. The minority faction obtained 30 percent of the 
executive posts, but once again, it failed to win any secretariats and was not represented 
in the day-to-day management of the union.22 Despite Fidalgo’s pledge to work for the 
integration of the minority faction, his decision to negotiate new agreements with the 
conservative Popular Party’s [PP] government exacerbated tensions with Moreno’s fac-
tion.   
The absolute majority of the PP government from 2000 to 2004 led to a more 
complicated context that hindered the relationship with the government. The UGT and 
CCOO tried unsuccessfully to negotiate some form of regulation to provide greater pro-
tection for temporary workers and to penalize the abuse of temporary contracts. The 
government’s unilateral labor market reform of May 2002 met with the opposition from 
                                                           
20See interview with Antonio Gutiérrez, former Secretary General of CCOO, in El Mundo, “Mantener a los crí-
ticos en la cúpula crearia confusion,” Sunday, January 14, 1996, pp. 33−34. Both Antonio Gutierrez and José 
María Fidalgo confirmed in interviews with the author that the opposition to the social concertation process 
was one of the key cleavages in this internal conflict. The victory of their positions facilitated the implemen-
tation of this strategy. 
21This strategic shift was confirmed during the interviews that I conducted with the leaders of the unions, 
including Antonio Gutiérrez, in December of 1996. 
22This was in contrast to the situation at the regional level. In Catalonia the 40 percent minority has 
negotiated responsibilities in the management bodies.   25 
the unions and a general strike on June 20, 2002. The success of this strike led the gov-
ernment to withdraw its proposals and repeal the law.  
This period also witnessed increasing turbulence between the two leading con-
federations. UGT refused to accept the agreement that CCOO reached with the govern-
ment and employers in 2001 to reform the state pension system,23 and CCOO refused to 
support a two-hour general strike organized by UGT in April 2003 to oppose the involve-
ment of Spain in the war in Iraq. 
While the UGT has remained quite stable internally, the situation has deteriorated 
further within the CCOO. The confederation held its eighth congress in April 2004 and 
this time there were three groups among the delegates: Fidalgo’s group with 60 percent 
of the delegates, Moreno’s with 23 percent, and a new group led by Rodolfo Benito (a 
former member of Fidalgo’s team who had left in 2002 due to differences of opinion) 
with 17 percent of the delegates. Differences among these groups revolved around the 
distribution of power within the union and accusations about the lack of respect for 
opinions from minorities and regional federations (in which the minority tendencies are 
in the majority, like Madrid). The most important debate, however, was, once again, 
about the bargaining stance of the union. The critics accused Fidalgo of being too keen 
on reaching agreements and to accept pacts that are very detrimental to workers (like 
the one on pensions that was opposed by UGT). Indeed, there is a clear divide between 
the minority groups who seek to use conflict as a bargaining tool to achieve benefits to 
workers, and the majority one, which views negotiations and social bargaining as a way 
to achieve favorable outcomes for workers. In addition, the majority rejects the minor-
ity’s overly political outlook about the role of the union. These positions have widened 
the differences about the strategic orientation of the union. In the end Fidalgo was re-
elected with 59 percent of the vote again the 29 percent obtained by Moreno. The pro-
gram of action for the next four years, however, received 78 percent of the votes. This 
program emphasizes the need to improve employment and maintain the system of 
social protection.  
The 2003 syndical elections reinforced the CCCO’s position within the labor 
movement. These election results seem to indicate some recovery by the unions relative 
to non-union representatives. 24 
 
Table 7: Number of Trade Union Representatives Elected During the 2003 Work Council 
Elections 
 
Trade Union  CCOO UGT  ELA-STV  CIG  Total 
  105,232  99,546  9,035 4,595 218,408 
Sources: Data from the Ministerio de Trabajo and Asuntos Sociales. 
 
In the end, the failure of labor confrontational strategies of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, which contributed to the deterioration of economic conditions and aggra-
                                                           
23The agreement included the possibility of increasing the number of years of employment that would be 
used to calculate pensions, therefore opening the door to the possible reduction of pensions. The UGT ada-
mantly refused to consider this possibility. 
24The confederation has gained 14,762 delegates vis-à-vis the election of 1999. The CCOO had 37.79 percent of 
the delegates in 1999 and 38.86 percent in 2003. The UGT had 37.01 percent in 1999 and 36.56 percent in 2003. 
Data from: CCOO.    26 
vated the employment crisis of the early 1990s, led Spanish unions to revaluate their 
strategies and complete a learning process that transformed their politics, strategies, and 
organizations in a radical way. 
 
Liberalization and European Integration 
The unions’ strategic shift was accelerated as a result of the combined processes 
of economic liberalization, privatization, and European integration. These developments 
had a significant impact in the industrial relations setting. At the macroeconomic level, 
the drive to prepare Spain for full integration within EMU influenced the government’s 
anti-inflationary stance. Since wages are such an important component of unit costs, 
wage bargaining became a cornerstone of the government’s anti-inflation policies (and 
the prospect for meeting the EMU criteria), therefore enhancing the political function of 
the unions and the concertation process. Unions agreed with the EMU objective and sup-
ported wage moderation as an instrument to achieve it.25 
At the micro level these processes have intensified competitive pressures and 
contributed to a shift in the balance of forces away from labor. Firms in Spain have been 
forced to design new strategies to confront new competitive challenges and have had to 
develop restructuring schemes that in many cases have led to the emergence of tripartite 
negotiations. At the same time, unions have been forced to accept new pressures to ad-
just working conditions and wages to the level of more advanced countries in order to 
increase competitiveness and create new jobs. In addition, Spanish firms’ efforts to im-
prove their competitiveness through further rationalization and labor market flexibility 
have led to tremendous changes in the business landscape with important implications 
for the unions. Restructuring and the privatization of publicly held companies have also 
influenced the strategies of Spanish unions. Outsourcing, downsizing, and reengineer-
ing have provoked significant changes in Fordist large-scale companies that used to be 
labor fortresses. As a consequence of these processes, employment in large and medium 
firms (over fifty employees) has declined considerably while the share of smaller firms 
(where unions are weaker) in employment has increased. Finally, European integration 
has forced the social actors to address the discrepancies between Spanish laws regulat-
ing the labor market and collective bargaining, and those prevailing in other EU coun-
tries.  
To sum up, the combination of these developments resulted in a learning process 
on the part of the unions’ leadership, which became convinced of the limits of a con-
frontational strategy, and led to new pragmatic and constructive strategies that facili-
tated their return to the bargaining table and thus the resurgence of social concertation 
in Spain (Espina 1999).26 This new strategy was reinforced by the increasing autonomy 
of the unions from political parties.27 The first result of this new approach was the sign-
ing of the bipartite agreement to resolve labor conflicts outside of the courts. This agree-
ment signaled the beginning of a new phase marked by the resurgence of social bargain-
                                                           
25This was confirmed my interviews with Antonio Gutierrez on 12/1996, José María Fidalgo on 5/2001, and 
Antonio Ferrer on 5/2001. 
26Espina (1999) views this development as the capstone of an “institutional learning process.” 
27Cándido Méndez, the Secretary General of UGT, in answer to a question about Izquierda Unida, stated in 
1995 that “our strategies cannot be conditioned by any political position no matter how respectable it may 
be,” in El País, “La reforma laboral no ha producido ningun efecto positivo.” Friday, October 27, 1995, p.58   27 
ing. This new process was facilitated by the electoral victory in 1996 of the conservative 
Popular Party. This victory, by a very slim margin, had a dual effect. On the one hand, 
the government, which had included in the electoral program the need to negotiate with 
the unions, promoted social bargaining as an instrument of legitimization to dissipate 
fears about the course of its policies. On the other hand, the unions, which had had a 
nasty breakdown with the Socialist government that had affected their outlook and 
made any agreement virtually impossible, took advantage of this new political environ-
ment to retake the initiative and play a role in the policymaking process. At the same 
time, the strategy to establish independent negotiating tables (in a way in which dis-
agreements in one table would not hinder advances in others) and to start negotiating 
the issues over which the level of consensus among the social actors was greater, facili-
tated the development of the bargaining process. This new dynamic facilitated bargain-
ing, fostered consensus building among the social actors, and promoted the institution-
alization of the process. 
In a changing environment unions took advantage of a new political context that 
provided opportunities for political exchange at the national level. This process was 
facilitated by the emergence of new institutions that fostered consensus among the social 
actors. In the end, economic restructuring and the relative weakening of trade unionism 
may have⎯and this is the paradox⎯contributed to the institutionalization of industrial 
relations. 
 
Conclusion 
This article stresses the need to explain social actors’ attempts to develop new 
solutions and change outcomes. Spain lacks encompassing labor market institutions, yet 
social concertation flourished in the 1980s-1990s. Hence, the institutional context per se 
is not able to explain the behavior of Spanish actors. The analysis of this case confirms 
that the consolidation of concertation does not depend solely on the organization of the 
actors, but also on the interests and strategies of the social actors themselves. This article 
examines the ways in which exogenous factors induce the social partners to review their 
positions and strategies vis-à-vis existing arrangements. It stresses the need to comple-
ment neoinstitutional explanations with a new set of hypotheses concerning actors’ 
behavior (see Regini 2000: 9). 
The resurgence of social concertation in Spain has been the result of the reorien-
tation of the strategies of the social actors. Developments within the international eco-
nomic environment and within the domestic structure have changed the balance of 
power among the social actors. These changes have facilitated the emergence of new 
strategies among the social actors and influenced their predisposition to negotiate and 
settle their differences through social bargaining. Preexisting institutions did not condi-
tion as much the choices made by the social actors. At the same time new emerging con-
straints and incentives to change largely determined their interaction and strategies. 
As we have seen, in a new economic and political context, trade union organiza-
tions have supported tripartite bargaining as a defensive strategy to retake the initiative 
and influence policy outcomes. The decision by the unions to return to the bargaining 
table was for the most part a defensive one, motivated by their weakening at the firm   28 
level (evidenced by the relative decline in union density28) and their incapacity to effec-
tively mobilize workers in a response to manpower policies to liberalize the labor mar-
ket. In other words, with their support for these macroeconomic agreements, unions 
sought to mitigate their decline in bargaining power at the workplace level. With these 
pacts they have also tried to counteract the reduction in their capacity for collective 
action, which was a consequence of being sidelined by employers and governments, as 
well as the erosion of their influence in the policymaking process.  
In addition, the resurgence of social bargaining has been fostered by a process of 
institutional learning and increasing autonomy of unions from political parties, which 
has led the social actors to conclude that previous confrontational strategies were detri-
mental to the interest of their constituencies and threatened their own survival. This de-
velopment also reflects an attempt by the social actors to reconcile the need to control 
costs through more flexibility in hiring practices and the need for cooperative relations 
at the firm level in order to remain competitive. In other words, these agreements have 
constituted an institutional mechanism to support business competitiveness through 
consultative practices (see Regini 2000).  
Spanish unions did not face the same levels of resistance against these agree-
ments (and particularly towards wage moderation) as unions in the Netherlands and 
other countries faced. First, the levels of membership were already very low and there-
fore they did not have much to lose. In addition, since the main trade-off (lower dis-
missals costs) did not affect older workers with permanent contracts (the core support of 
unions) the risk of further defections was very low. On the contrary, by addressing the 
main concern of temporary workers (more stable contracts) these agreements helped 
unions to build support from a younger generation of workers, women, and the unem-
ployed. 
For their part, the government and employers’ associations decided that while 
competitiveness and costs were contingent on the increasing flexibility of labor and 
firms, they also depended on the ability of the national system in which they operate to 
provide collective goods⎯namely, education, training, wage coordination, and labor co-
operation. Hence, they acknowledged that the crucial problem for their firms was the 
need to institutionalize further the production of collective goods (Regini 2000: 19). Con-
sequently, employers gave priority to continuing social concertation and supported 
cooperative strategies as instruments to further competitiveness.29 They understood that 
the most effective way to achieve wage moderation and to liberalize the labor market 
would be through the acquiescence of unions.30 Confrontation led to higher wages and 
the paralysis of the reform and liberalization processes in the second half of the 1980s 
                                                           
28According to the European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line (EIRO) “crude” union density figures 
in Spain stand at between 10-19 percent, the lowest in the EU with Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. 
29Although employers’ associations publicly and frequently express their antagonism toward trade unions, 
criticize an environment which they consider hostile to them, and demand greater labor market flexibility, 
in private, during the course of the interviews that I conducted with employer associations’ leaders in Spain 
in 2000, 2001 and 2004, they recognized the need for greater cooperation and stressed the benefits of 
concertation. 
30While the government had been one of the leading actors in the first period of social bargaining, in the 
1990s it played more of a secondary role. The social partners asserted their autonomy and rejected an inter-
ventionist approach. The Government enacted the legislation to implement the agreements, but the bulk of 
the bargaining and the trade-offs took place between the unions and employers.   29 
and first half of the 1990s because unions had effective veto power through mobiliza-
tions. Social bargaining, on the other hand, had resulted in wage moderation and offered 
a gradual and stable path toward reform and liberalization of the labor market (Royo 
2002: pp. 176-77). 
One of the main challenges for the so-called under-organized economies, such as 
Spain, is to build the coordinating capacity among the social actors that will allow them 
to respond to international pressures and solve the economic problems that result from 
increasing international competition and market integration (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
While changes in production regimes and occupational structure demand greater flexi-
bility, increasing competition rewards institutional mechanisms that facilitate coopera-
tion among the social actors and tilt the balance of wage-setting toward the tradable sec-
tor of the economy. The experience of Spain suggests that market integration and inter-
national competition also create pressures that promote social bargaining. 
Paradoxically, the economic pressures that are eroding the coordination mecha-
nisms of Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), are offering incentives to the Spanish 
social actors to address new challenges through social pacts. Spanish governments are 
also trying to make labor markets more flexible, but distributional conflicts are not 
necessarily leading to a neoliberal solution. Indeed, in Spain the main forces of change 
⎯namely, financial integration, difficult macroeconomic circumstances, technological 
changes, the transformation in the nature of business, and new demands on educational 
and professional training systems⎯have led the social actors to implement significant 
changes in the Spanish systems of corporate governance. In addition, fiscal decentrali-
zation, little labor mobility, EMU, and relatively inflexible labor markets are also exerting 
particular pressures in the Spanish economy.  
In this light, the Spanish agreements conform to a mixed (mid pluralist) model of 
corporatism that is rather different in form from the traditional Social Democratic (SD) 
corporatism of the Scandinavian countries (Rhodes 1998).31 This new form of neocor-
poratism focuses on reduced labor costs and competitiveness (Hassel and Ebbinghaus 
2000), and it is characterized by concertation among weaker organizations (as opposed 
to the centralized peak organizations with a monopoly of representation that charac-
terize the Scandinavian countries), with governments acting as instigators of social pacts 
to reform labor legislation or social programs (Rhodes 1998: 183; Hassel and Ebbinghaus 
2000: 80). These scholars have noted that the main problem with the new form of 
corporatist pacts is that the political exchange is far less certain and predictable. Fiscal, 
economic, and competitive pressures prevent governments from compensating unions 
with an expansion of social and welfare programs. In this new economic environment, 
the rewards and incentives of social bargaining are not as immediate and evident as they 
used to be. Consequently, the terms of the bargain are likely to change from one set of 
negotiations to the next, and the social actors have less incentives to engage in this 
political exchange. Hence, these arrangements are more likely to be less stable and sub-
ject to periodic breakdown.32 
                                                           
31Rhodes has defined this new form of corporatism as “competitive corporatism.” 
32The general strike of 2002 in Spain organized by the unions, in response to a unilateral labor reform by the 
government, illustrates this point. The success of this strike led to government to back off, modify the   30 
In sum, the analysis of the Spanish case shows that countries are not stuck in a 
particular pattern of labor relations and practices. It rejects institutional deterministic ap-
proaches and illustrates that although institutions are path dependent, they still offer 
constraints and opportunities for change. In the industrial relations arena Spain is mov-
ing from “state capitalism” to “managed capitalism.” The election of a new Socialist gov-
ernment in March of 2004 opens up a new scenario with strong correlations between the 
positions of the government and the social actors. The Ministry of Labor has declared 
publicly that there would be no reforms by decree, and the new Prime Minister, Rod-
ríguez Zapatero, has opened up a round of dialogue with unions and employers to initi-
ate a new phase of social bargaining. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reform and satisfy most of the unions’ demands. Despite this confrontation, unions and employers reached 
new agreements (including a collective bargaining one to set wage increases for 2003) in subsequent months. 
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Table 8: Real Wages (RL) and Labor Productivity (LP) in the European Union, 1961-2000 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000  1961-
70 
1971-
80 
1981-
90 
1991-
2000 
Austria  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  2.5 1.4 1.7 0.5 0.6 -0.2  -1.0  2.3  1.8  1.2 4.6 4.2 1.6 1.1 
Labor 
productivity 
1.8 0.9 1.0 2.3 1.5  2.6  0.7 1.9  1.1  2.1 5.1 2.9 2.2 1.6 
RW  -  LP  0.7 0.5 0.7 -1.8  -0.9 -2.8 -1.7 0.4 0.7 -0.9 -0.5  1.3  0.6 -0.4 
Belgium  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  4.6 2.1 0.0 2.2 0.5  0.0  1.4 0.5 1.2 1.1  4.3  4.7  0.4  1.4 
Labor 
productivity 
1.9 2.0 -0.8 3.4 1.8  0.7  2.7 1.5  0.9  1.7 4.4 3.2 1.8 1.6 
RW  -  LP  2.7  0.1 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3  -0.7  -0.7 -1.0 0.3  -0.5  -0.1  1.5  -1.4  -0.2 
Denmark  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  1.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.6  0.7  2.0 0.9 2.0 1.3  3.9  1.6  0.5  1.7 
Labor 
productivity 
2.0 2.2 2.3 6.2 3.0  1.5  1.0 0.5  1.3  2.1 3.4 1.6 2.0 2.2 
RW  -  LP  -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -4.2 -0.4  -0.8  1.0  0.4  0.7  -0.8  0.5  0.0  -1.5  -0.5 
Finland  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  4.4 1.3 -1.4 1.1 -0.2  2.9  -0.3  1.7  2.1  2.7 3.7 3.6 2.5 1.4 
Labor 
productivity 
-0.7 4.2 5.4 5.1 2.2  2.6  2.9 3.0  1.7  2.0 4.4 3.2 2.6 2.8 
RW  -  LP  5.1 -2.9 -6.8 -4.0 -2.4  0.3  -3.1 -1.3 0.4  0.7  -0.7  0.4  -0.1  -1.4 
France  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  1.4 2.2 0.7 0.2 0.9  1.2  0.8 1.6 1.3 0.8  4.9  3.6  1.1  1.1 
Labor 
productivity 
1.0 2.3 0.8 2.4 1.2  1.3  1.9 2.1  1.3  1.5 4.9 2.9 2.1 1.6 
RW  -  LP  0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -2.2 -0.3  -0.1  -1.1 -0.5 0.0  -1.7  0.0  0.7  -1.0  -0.4 
Germany*  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Nominal 
wages 
1.9 5.3 0.6 0.7 1.8  1.1  0.6 0.3  0.9  0.8 4.6 2.9 0.8 1.4 
Labor 
productivity 
2.5 3.9 0.5 2.7 1.8  1.5  2.3 1.8  1.1  2.3 4.2 2.6 1.7 2.0 
RW  -  LP  -0.6 1.4 -0.1 -2.0 0.0  -0.4 -1.7 -1.5 -0.2 -1.5  0.4  0.3  -0.9 -0.6 
Greece  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  -3.7 -2.6 -4.0 -0.4 2.8 1.4 5.4  0.8  1.3 2.0 6.3 3.2 0.1 0.2 
Labor 
productivity 
5.6 -0.7 -2.5 0.1 1.2  2.8  3.8 0.3 2.1 2.4  9.3  3.0 -0.3 1.5 
RW  -  LP  -9.3 -1.9 -1.5 -0.5 1.6  -1.4  1.6  0.5 -0.8 -0.4  -3.0  0.2  -0.4  -1.3 
Ireland  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  2.5 4.1 1.1 0.7 -1.0 1.1  2.0 -0.8 2.1  2.1  4.1  4.2  2.1  1.4 
Labor 
productivity 
1.9 2.3 2.0 2.6 4.2  3.9  4.9 3.8  3.4  3.6 4.2 3.7 3.8 3.2 
RW  -  LP  -0.6 -1.8 -0.9 -0.9 -5.2  -2.8  -2.9 -4.6 -1.3 -1.5  -0.1  0.5  -1.7  -1.8 
Italy  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  1.1 1.2 0.6 -0.4  -0.8 1.1  1.6 -4.2 0.6  0.5  5.9  3.0  1.0  0.1 
Labor 
productivity 
0.6 1.4 2.2 3.2 2.9  0.8  1.4 0.6  0.3  1.4 6.2 2.6 1.6 1.5 
RW  -  LP  0.5 -0.2 1.6 -3.6 -3.7  0.3  0.2 -4.8 0.3  0.9  -0.3  0.4  -0.6 -1.4 
Luxembourg  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  4.8 1.0 4.3 -1.2 1.5  0.6 -0.5  -1.0  0.9  0.8 2.5 3.9 1.6 1.1 
Labor 
productivity 
2.0 2.0 6.8 1.6 1.3  0.2  3.9 0.6  0.5  1.4 2.9 1.4 2.7 2.0 
RW  -  LP  2.8 -1.0 -2.5 -2.8 0.2  0.4  -4.4 -1.6 -0.4 -0.6  -0.4  2.5  -1.1  -0.9 
Netherlands  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  .   32 
Real  wages  1.7 2.3 1.4 0.4 0.0  0.3  0.1 0.6 1.9 0.9  5.1  3.0  0.2  1.0 
Labor 
productivity 
0.9 1.0 0.9 3.6 0.8  0.5  1.0 1.0  0.9  1.1 3.9 2.7 1.6 1.2 
RW  -  LP  0.8 1.3 0.5 -3.2  -0.8 -0.2 -0.9  -0.4 1.0 0.2  1.2  0.3 -1.4 -0.2 
Portugal  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  5.3 5.7 -0.7 -0.7 2.0  3.1  1.3 -0.4 2.5  2.8  6.6  5.6  1.4  2.1 
Labor 
productivity 
-0.4 4.2 1.0 3.3 3.6  2.3  2.1 0.9  1.7  2.0 6.2 4.7 3.0 2.1 
RW  -  LP  4.9 -1.5 -1.7 -4.0 -1.6  0.8  0.8 -1.3 0.8  0.8  0.4  0.9  -1.6  0.0 
Spain  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  2.3 3.3 2.4 -1.2  -1.8 0.5 0.6  0.5  -0.2  0.3 7.1 4.6 0.7 0.7 
Labor 
productivity 
1.3 2.3 1.8 2.8 0.9  1.1  1.1 0.2  0.4  1.0 6.7 4.2 2.2 1.3 
RW  -  LP  -1.1 -1.1 -0.6 -4.0 -2.7  -0.6  -0.5 0.3 -0.6 -0.7  0.4  0.4  -1.5  -0.6 
Sweden  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  -0.8 2.9 1.7 2.4 -0.7 5.3  1.8 1.9 3.3 2.4 4.1 1.6 0.7 2.0 
Labor 
productivity 
0.4 3.2 3.2 4.9 2.3  1.7  2.6 1.7  1.1  1.7 3.9 1.2 1.3 2.3 
RW  -  LP  -1.2 -0.3 -1.5 -2.5 -3.0  3.6  -0.6 0.2  2.2  0.7  0.2  0.4  -0.6  -0.3 
UK  . . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  2.1 1.5 1.4 1.8 0.1  0.2  1.7 2.3 2.6 2.2  2.7  1.7  2.2  1.6 
Labor 
productivity 
1.6 2.2 3.8 2.6 1.2  1.3  1.7 1.1  0.4  2.0 2.6 1.6 2.2 1.8 
RW  -  LP  0.5 -0.7 -2.4 -0.8 -1.1  -1.1 0.0 1.2 2.2 0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0 -0.2 
European 
Union 
. . . . .  .  . . . .  .  .  .  . 
Real  wages  1.7 2.8 0.8 0.4 0.4  0.8  0.9 0.3 1.3 1.1  4.5  3.0  0.9  1.1 
Labor 
productivity 
1.5 2.5 1.6 2.8 1.7  1.3  1.8 1.3  0.9  1.8 4.6 2.7 1.9 1.7 
RW  -  LP  -0.2 -0.3 -0.8 -2.4 -2.3  -0.5  -0,9 -1.0 0.4  -0.7  -0.1  0.3  -1.0  -0.6 
Real wages = real compensation per employee, deflator GDP, annual percentage change; labor productivity = GDP at 
1995 market prices per person employed, annual percentage change; RW- LP = real wages minus labor productivity; * 
1961-91 West Germany.  
Source: European Commission, European Economy No. 68 (1999) 
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